Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
International Business Faculty Publications

Institute of International Business

201

The East Asian Miracle? Thailand Melts Down
Mary Bumgarner
Kennesaw State University, mary_bumgarner@coles2.kennesaw.edu

Penelope B. Prime
Georgia State University, pprime@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/intlbus_facpub
Part of the International Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Bumgarner, Mary and Prime, Penelope B., "The East Asian Miracle? Thailand Melts Down" (201).
International Business Faculty Publications. 28.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/intlbus_facpub/28

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute of International Business at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Business Faculty Publications by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

“’The East Asian Miracle?’: Thailand Melts Down”

1

“The East Asian Miracle?” Thailand Melts Down
Mary Bumgarner and Penelope B. Prime
Published by Casenet (http://casenet.thomsonlearning.com), 2001.

INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1997, Thailand’s Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh’s government
was not yet a year old, and the economy was in turmoil. The baht had been under intense
pressure from international speculators since February, and the banking system was
wobbling under the weight of bad loans. Depositors, fearing a collapse of the country’s
smaller financial institutions, had shifted their money to the top five banks who, in an
attempt to reduce risk and to conserve capital, had repaid their international loans and
were no longer lending to the business sector.1 Moreover, the stock market, worried that
many of the country’s property companies might be forced into bankruptcy, had declined
by 45% since its peak in early 1996.2
Yongchaiyudh had insisted on defending the value of the baht as well as
supporting the country’s financial institutions, many of whose owners had helped elect
him to office. Now it appeared his economic policies had failed, and he had to chart a
new course. Amnuay Viravan, the well respected Finance Minister, who had resigned in
frustration on June 19th, probably would have insisted on a policy of continuing to
defend the baht, but Thanong Bhidaya, his replacement, was not as certain of that policy.
THAILAND: AN ECONOMIC SUCCESS STORY
The Prime Minister was proud of what his country had achieved. During the
1970s, Thailand, a small country located in the center of the Southeast Asian peninsula,
was an unqualified economic success story. Based on its ability to maintain high rates of
saving and investment, Thailand was among the fastest growing and most successful
developing countries in the world, experiencing average annual rates of growth in GDP
of 7 percent or more every year. But, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, rising interest
rates and oil prices led to an economic slump. Thailand’s annual GDP growth rate still
remained higher than the average for middle-income countries, but its economic growth
targets were not met.
Deciding that further economic growth depended on the ability of the Thai
government to improve economic efficiency through development planning, the
government switched from import substitution to export promotion. Thailand reduced
non-tariff barriers, decreased the import surtax, and in November of 1984 devalued the
currency to 25 baht per dollar. In addition, approval procedures for foreign investment
projects were simplified and generous investment incentive packages were offered.
High levels of economic growth resumed. Between 1986 and 1996, the annual
average rate of growth in Thailand’s gross national product (GNP) was 9.5 percent, while
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GNP per capita rose by 7.9 percent.
In 1992, Thailand’s central bank, the Bank of Thailand, introduced a
comprehensive program of financial reforms that were designed to position Thailand as a
future financial center in the region and encourage competition among the country’s
financial institutions. At that time, Thailand’s banking system was comprised of
commercial banks that handled the majority of all financial transactions in the country,
and numerous finance and security companies that dealt with smaller borrowers.
The measures proposed by the Bank of Thailand included the liberalization of
exchange rate controls, the removal of legal ceilings on banks’ deposit and lending rates,
and the improvement of prudential supervision according to international standards. In
addition, the reforms began the process of developing Thailand’s money and capital
markets, and established the Bangkok International Banking Facilities.3
THAILAND: A CAUTIONARY TALE
The establishment of the Bangkok International Banking Facilities provided many
of Thailand’s larger firms with easy access to offshore currency markets. Businesses in
Thailand found borrowing in these markets attractive because foreign interest rates,
particularly U.S. rates, were lower than those in Thailand, and because Thailand’s pegged
exchange rate minimized currency risk. As a result, many Thai companies began to
borrow dollars, convert the proceeds to baht, and invest in Thai assets. Thailand’s banks
and finance companies also borrowed large amounts abroad to lend at home to those
smaller businesses that still did not have access to international capital markets. As a
result, beginning in 1993 the amount of foreign capital, much of it short-term, flowing
into Thailand began to increase steadily.
By the mid-1990s, the supply of foreign capital exceeded the country’s high
return investment opportunities, and a significant portion of the foreign funds started to
flow into more speculative projects. Asset prices, especially stock market values, land
values, and real estate prices rose rapidly.4 Moreover, the foreign capital inflow put
upward pressure on the exchange value of the baht, requiring the Bank of Thailand to
intervene regularly to ensure that the baht traded in a narrow band between 25.2 to 25.6
baht to the U.S. dollar.
The policy of supporting the pegged exchange rate was pursued in order to
maintain Thailand’s competitive position in the region. Rising wages and other costs had
already forced many of Thailand’s low cost assembly businesses to move to countries
with cheaper labor.5 The recession in Japan had cut into demand for Thailand’s products,
and China, a rising competitor in the region, had devalued its currency in 1990, 1991, and
again in 1994. The rising baht compounded these problems, particularly during the 1995
to 1997 period when the U.S. dollar gained 50 percent against the yen. Export growth
slumped badly in 1996, and a large and growing current account imbalance emerged.6
THAILAND: A COUNTRY IN CRISIS
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By the end of 1996, Thailand’s external debt levels were rising. According to the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), foreign currency debt with a maturity of less
than two years was equal to about 120 percent of Thailand’s foreign exchange reserves.7
In addition, Thailand’s trade deficit was 8% of GDP. As investor concern about these
figures rose, (some observers pointed to the fact that Mexico’s trade deficit was 8 percent
of GDP when its currency collapsed), the Thai government countered that neither
circumstance presented Thailand with a serious long-term problem. External debts, it
claimed, were not a threat because unlike Mexico they did not result from large publicsector imbalances or excessive consumption spending. Thailand’s foreign borrowing was
being used mainly to increase investment.8 Furthermore, the government claimed,
Thailand had successfully financed large current account deficits for several years, and its
high growth and high savings economy suggested no compelling reason that this could
not continue.9
Thai authorities pointed to the fact that savings were 35.3 percent of GDP, and
that GDP growth, equal to 6.7 percent in 1996, had grown at a rate of 8.5 percent
between 1990 and 1995. The government budget surplus equaled 1.5 percent of GDP,
and the inflation rate was 5.8 percent. Moreover, the country’s debt was rated A3,10 and
according to the Bank of Thailand, at the end of 1996 non-performing loans of the six
largest commercial banks altogether accounted for only 6.98 percent of the total lending,
a ratio that was not high by regional standards.11
Crisis in the Banking Industry
The banking crisis began on February 5, 1997, when Somprasong Land, a Thai
property developer, announced that it had failed to make a scheduled $3.1 million interest
payment on an $80 billion eurobond loan.12 Thai banks tended to be particularly
vulnerable to collapsing property values because they made loans against collateral, not
cash flow, and that collateral often was speculative real estate. Figures released in
December by the Bank of Thailand suggested that non-performing loans of all the
country’s commercial banks had only grown from 6.92 percent to 7.73 percent of the
total in the first six months of 1996.13 But, many observers believed that those figures
were optimistic and that 10 percent or more of all commercial bank loans were probably
bad. They based these opinions on the fact that loans secured against property were not
classified as bad until interest payments were a full year in arrears,14 as well as the fact
that the property crisis was deepening. At the beginning of 1997, empty property was
estimated to be approximately 350,000 units in Bangkok and 850,000 units nationwide
with more construction underway.15
The problems in the country’s finance companies were thought to be even more
severe despite the central bank’s assurances that the finance companies were in good
condition.16 17
The Government’s Response
On March 3rd, the Bank of Thailand and the Ministry of Finance introduced new
regulations designed “to prevent the problem of asset quality from casting doubts on
financial institutions and to further strengthen the overall health of the financial sector.”
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These regulations required all financial institutions to make full provision against
possible loan losses. In addition, financial institutions with insufficient liquidity were
ordered to increase their capital immediately. Any institution that was unable to increase
its capital by itself was encouraged to turn to the Financial Institutions Development
Fund,18 which would step in to purchase the increased shares.19
The Financial Institutions Development Fund (The Fund) was a separate legal
entity managed by the Bank of Thailand. The Fund collected annual contributions from
all financial institutions under the supervision of the Bank of Thailand at the ratio of
0.2% of deposits, and under certain circumstances, was allowed to borrow from the Bank
of Thailand. The Fund also was permitted to lend money, take equities in certain
institutions, and bail out troubled institutions by purchasing their non-performing assets.20
The introduction of new banking regulations was followed on March 10th by an
announcement from the Thai government that it would buy $3.9 billion in bad property
debt from its financial institutions.21 To fund this buyout, the Cabinet approved the
establishment of the Property Loan Management Organization (PLMO) to purchase
property loans with collateral from financial institutions for the purpose of managing and
enhancing their value. The PLMO was to be established with registered capital of 1
million baht to be appropriated from the government budget. Its working capital, up to
100,000 million baht, was to be raised through the sale of government-guaranteed bonds
as approved by the Cabinet. The bonds were to be sold to general investors.22
The government argued that because the funds to finance the PLMO would come
from market sources the measure was consistent with the government’s policy of
maintaining strict fiscal and monetary discipline. Financial institutions’ non-performing
loans would be reduced while the public that bought property units would be protected by
the continuation of the projects. The authorities stated that they were “confident that this
measure would positively strengthen the financial condition of the property sector while
further strengthening the soundness of Thailand’s financial institutions.”23
Thailand’s support of its financial institutions was not universally acclaimed. A
typical criticism was voiced by a German banker who noted that “The Thai mentality is
that everything gets bailed out. It isn’t good for market discipline, and it isn’t good for
the banking system. Market forces only work half way in Thailand.”24
Thai Finance Minister Amnuay Virawan defended the government’s policies by
saying, “We don’t take things to extremes. We need to do things in between the Japanese
and U.S. way.”25 Michel Camdessus, the Managing Director of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), responded to Thailand’s measures by saying, “I don’t see any
reason for this crisis to develop further.”26
On April 2nd, the Bank of Thailand took yet another step to stabilize the banking
industry by endorsing the Thai Danu Bank and Finance One merger.27 Finance One,
Thailand’s largest finance company, had pioneered the practice of issuing eurobonds
denominated in U.S. dollars and using the proceeds to finance lending to the country’s
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property developers. The strategy was profitable so long as property values continued to
rise, but when the property market began to collapse in 1996, and developers could not
repay their loans, Finance One’s non-performing loans quadrupled.28 Estimates placed
Finance One’s bad debt and investments at $600 million.29
The merger with Thai Danu was intended to save Finance One from failing and
was seen as a precedent for future consolidations among other Thai financial institutions,
which over time would result in a stronger and more efficient financial system.
Consequently, the government was prepared to facilitate the process by encouraging the
Finance Ministry to clear tax obstacles that might prevent the merger from proceeding.
In addition, the Financial Institutions Development Fund was expected to provide
liquidity assistance and the Property Loan Management Organization to assist with any
non-performing property loans.30
Nevertheless on May 23, 1997, the Boards of Finance One and Thai Danu called
off the merger because of legal problems and differing due diligence. The Bank of
Thailand immediately ordered Finance One to make provisions for sufficient reserves to
cover their losses and to increase its capital.31
Crisis in the Currency Market
Although both foreign and local investors had begun to withdraw funds from
Thailand’s financial markets in 1996,32 the currency crisis did not begin until February
14, 1997. At that time, many Thai borrowers began to hedge their currency exposure by
entering forward contracts that obligated them to sell a specific amount of baht in the
future in exchange for dollars at the current forward rate. In addition, currency
speculators, believing the Bank of Thailand did not have sufficient reserves to defend the
currency, began to short sell the baht, hoping to force a devaluation.33
In order to short sell the currency, the speculators borrowed baht from a financial
institution and immediately resold those baht in the foreign exchange market for dollars.
Counting on the value of the baht falling, the speculators expected to make a profit by
spending fewer dollars to repay the financial institution than they received from the initial
sale of the baht. If, however, the baht did not fall but rose, the speculators stood to lose
substantial sums of money.
The Bank of Thailand responded to the attack by raising interest rates and
instructing Thailand’s banks to limit the availability of the baht. The Bank spent an
estimated $500 million of its $39 billion in reserves defending the currency, and was
believed to have bought several billion dollars worth of baht in the forward markets as
well.34
Faced with a shortage of baht, the speculators were forced to scramble for
overseas baht in Singapore’s market in order to secure sufficient currency to meet their
commitments. The value of the baht peaked at 22-23 baht per dollar.35
Despite the punishment inflicted on the speculators in February, by May
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Thailand’s currency was again under attack. This time the attack was triggered by a
comment made by a senior economic advisor who, following a month of rumors that the
Bank of Thailand had lost tens of billions of dollars defending the baht,36 suggested that
devaluation might be necessary.37
The Bank of Thailand emphatically denied that any change in the exchange rate
mechanism was being considered and reaffirmed the government’s commitment to
maintain the stability of the baht.38 39 Nevertheless, rumors that Finance Minister
Amnuay Viravan would soon be dismissed and exchange rate policies would be changed
persisted.40 The impression of confusion was “heightened by an emergency meeting on
May 11, when the Prime Minister, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, announced that he was going
to take personal charge of the economy.”41
To counter the attack on the currency, Thailand engaged in a joint action with
Singapore in the foreign exchange market on May 14th, spending nearly $7 billion
defending the baht’s peg. The amount of reserves that the Bank committed at this time
for future purchases of the baht was not disclosed, but rumors again put the figure in the
billions.42
The Bank also imposed informal exchange controls by prohibiting onshore
financial institutions from lending baht to the offshore market. This action effectively
created a two-tier currency market, with one tier in Thailand and the other offshore, a
situation that allowed offshore interest rates to soar. In fact, in the offshore market,
where speculators faced a sudden and severe shortage of baht, interest rates rose to 400
percent.43 “I think they are using the big stick approach,” said Wong Yit Fan, Chief
Economist for Southeast Asia at Standard Chartered Bank in Singapore. “They want to
hit speculators so very hard that they won’t think about speculating on the currency for
another six months.”44
The fact that the central bank chose to quell the currency speculation by imposing
exchange controls made it clear that the government was unwilling to increase domestic
interest rates by enough to slow the capital outflow. In fact, on May 26th the Bank made
the following statement as part of its Economic Outlook for 1997:
“Progressive improvement has been observed on the stability front, both as regard
inflation and the current account balance which are expected to continue. Moreover, the
Government has announced clear-cut measures to maintain fiscal discipline such as
expenditure cutting from the 1997 budget and cautious budgeting for the 1998 budget, as
well as measures to increase revenue to ensure a balanced budget for 1998.
Consequently, to achieve an appropriate policy mix between fiscal and monetary
policy under present economic circumstances, the Bank of Thailand wishes to confirm
that the Bank will closely monitor the situation and ensure sufficient liquidity in the
system to finance normal economic and investment activities.”45
The refusal of the central bank’s authorities to tighten further was grounded in
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their belief that the tight monetary policy followed by the Bank of Thailand since 1995 to
contain inflation and increases in the current account had worked as expected. But, the
coincidental sharp slowdown of exports and capital inflows in 1996, together with
problems in some of Thailand’s financial institutions, had resulted in a rapid deceleration
of investment and economic growth.46 Higher interest rates would surely result in a
recession or worse.
In addition, the central bank continued to blame many of their economic problems
on external factors such as the press coverage of the crisis and the activities of currency
speculators. “They blame the ills of the country, not on press freedom but on abuse of
that freedom,” said Chatchai Yenbamrung, a media adviser to Chavalit and editor of
Business Day, a Bangkok based daily.47 Mr. Amnuay Viravan, when asked about the
crisis, claimed that Thailand was “facing a major threat from very greedy people.”48
He was not alone in that sentiment. Many people in Thailand were furious that
wealthy foreigners were trying to bankrupt the country for personal gain.49 Thai
authorities singled out George Soros, a well-known currency speculator, in particular, and
in June it was reported that government authorities “gloated gleefully” over the losses its
foreign exchange policies caused the speculators in May.50
THE THAI CRISIS: END GAME
The month of June opened with the Bank of Thailand disputing inaccurate reports
and defending the government’s policies. On June 1, the Bank categorically denied a
report that it had proposed to the government that it should issue a special decree to force
30 finance companies to merge.51 And, on June 11th, it derided a negative report about
Thailand’s growth rate published by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia.
The Bank claimed that “Any forecast of a negative growth rate for Thailand this
year is simply “absurd” and “irresponsible,” especially when the conclusion has been
drawn from pure speculation and prejudice, without any due regard for proper
macroeconomic analysis.” The Bank insisted that the government’s fiscal and monetary
policies were working as expected, including the exchange controls imposed in May, and
that any economic slowdown was a “natural outcome” after a decade of high growth.52
On June 19th, Thailand’s Finance Minister, Mr. Amnuay Virawan, frustrated by
his inability to convince the Cabinet to raise taxes to help close an impending budget
deficit, resigned. The Thai stock market fell 2 percent on hearing the news.53 The Prime
Minister said that he would step in as acting Finance Minister, while ruling out a
devaluation of the baht. “We will never devalue the baht,” he said, and blamed the market
for exaggerating the extent of Thailand’s difficulties.54 Nevertheless, some of the
market’s worries seemed to be “shared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose
director on June 17th urged Thailand to take strong measures ‘as rapidly as
possible.’” 55 Mr. Thanong Bhidaya, a man relatively unknown in Thai politics, was
named Finance Minister on June 20th.
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On June 27th, the central bank suspended the operations of 16 finance companies
and ordered them to submit merger or consolidation plans.56 This order was confirmed on
June 29th, when the Bank reported that it would not suspend any more finance and
securities companies. It also announced that the Minister of Finance and the Governor of
the Bank of Thailand would make public statements on June 30, 1997 giving details of
additional measures to ensure stability in the banking system, and that these plans would
be submitted to the Cabinet for approval on July 1, 1997.57
The suspension of the finance companies came as a shock to many international
bankers. Throughout the month of June, the Bank of Thailand had urged foreign bankers
to continue lending to the finance companies, promising that they would be protected if
any of those companies experienced problems. Furthermore, the list appeared arbitrary,
and rumors swept Bangkok that it was meant to be far more comprehensive. “They shot
themselves in the foot.” declared the branch manager for one international bank. “If they
had done it right, the list would have been far larger. But there was a lot of lobbying by
politicians who had stakes in some of the finance companies to have their names
eliminated.”58
On June 30th, the Prime Minister appeared on television and assured the nation
that there would be no devaluation of the baht, lest Thais “all become poor.”59
Nevertheless, on July 2nd, the government of Thailand made the following
announcement:
NOTIFICATION OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Re: Change of Foreign Exchange System
By virtue of the power conferred upon him under section 8 Paragraph Three of the
Currency Act, B.E. 2501, as amended by The Currency Act (No. 4), B.E. 2516,
The Minister of Finance, upon the recommendation of the Bank of Thailand,
hereby issues this notification as follows:
The Notification of the Ministry of Finance dated 2 November B.E. 2527 Re:
Change of Foreign Exchange System is hereby repealed.
1.
The foreign exchange system shall be such that the value of the Baht is set
by conditions in foreign exchange markets.
2.
The Bank of Thailand shall engage in buying and selling of foreign
currency for the purpose of maintaining the stability of the Baht under the
system mentioned in 2.
3.
The Bank of Thailand shall from time to time as deemed necessary,
publish the exchange rates between the Baht and foreign currencies for use
as a reference rate in conversion of foreign currencies into Baht.
Given on 2 nd July B.E. 2540
(signed) Thanong Bhidaya
Minister of Finance60
Following the announcement, the value of the baht fell 20 percent, igniting an
economic crisis. Devaluation meant that the country’s foreign currency debt, much of
which was unhedged, had suddenly became considerably more costly to service. Given

“’The East Asian Miracle?’: Thailand Melts Down”

9

the long-lived stability of the baht, borrowers had expected the baht-dollar exchange to
remain fixed. Now, with the baht being allowed to float, those borrowers had to pay
significantly more in baht to service their foreign loans, causing some firms to close with
many others facing imminent bankruptcy.61 Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh,
after initially balking at the idea, sought help from the IMF.
The IMF extended a $10 billion loan to Thailand and helped Bangkok arrange up
to $5 billion more from other sources, most of them Japanese banks. The money was to
be used to boost Thailand’s foreign-currency reserves and to help fund the currentaccount deficit. The prevailing sentiment was that the existence of the loan would be
enough to stem the crisis. “The actual money is unimportant,” said one government
official, “Whether it was $5 billion or $50 billion would hardly make a difference. Once
we accept IMF austerity measures and impose fiscal discipline, banks around the world
would be willing to lend us what we need.”62
For its part the government began to follow the IMF’s advice. On Aug 5th, it
suspended the operations of 42 finance companies, bringing the total number temporarily
closed since June to 58. Bangkok also promised to abide by an austerity program that
required the government to trim the budget by $3.1 billion, cut the current account deficit
to 5 percent of GDP in 1997 and 3 percent in 1998, keep foreign reserves above $25
million, and raise taxes. They also agreed to speed up the privatization of state assets and
to allow foreigners to own a majority state in the country’s financial institutions.63
Thailand’s neighbors welcomed the IMF bailout. Should Thailand implode, they
would have had considerable difficulty convincing the world that their currencies and
economies were not next in line. Many feared that Thailand’s politicians would not have
the political courage to tackle the country’s property glut and banking crisis. “This is the
bitter medicine Thailand needs,” said U.S. based Ismail Dalla, a Thai-born Indian fund
manager who once worked with the World Bank. “What the IMF is doing is forcing on
Thailand the fiscal discipline it has always lacked.”64
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Exhibit 1
Thailand: Major Economic Indicators
1990

1993

1994

1995

1996

Growth, Investment, Savings & Consumption:
Annual % Growth in GDP1
GDP, constant prices, billion baht2
GDP, current prices, billion baht2
GDP per capita, current prices, baht2
GDP per capita, PPP, current $1
Gross Capital Formation, % of GDP1
Gross Domestic Savings, % of GDP1
Total Consumption, % of GDP1

11.75
1,945
2,183
39,104
4,000
41.1
33.8
66.4

8.34
2,473
3,170
54,650
5,325
40.0
35.8
63.9

8.79
2,695
3,630
61,840
5,827
40.3
35.4
63.7

9.24
2,933
4,188
70,520
6,492
42.1
35.4
63.8

6.41
3,095
4,598
76,634
6,873
41.8
35.5
64.7

Government Finance2
Overall Budget Surplus/Deficit, million baht
Domestic Borrowing, net, million baht
Foreign Borrowing, net, million baht

105,505 59,713
-11,864 -44,347
-39,217 -4,353

97,368
-58,872
-17,426

126,247 43,303
-30,574 -25,123
-4,855
-3,665

Money and Banking
Money & Quasi Money Growth, annual %1
Real Interest Rate, %1
Commercial Rate, %2
Deposit Interest Rate, %2
Inflation, Consumer Prices, annual %1

26.68
10.25
19.00
12.25
5.97

18.38
11.84
14.50
8.62
3.38

12.86
9.42
14.38
8.45
5.16

17.01
n.a.
16.25
11.58
5.16

12.57
n.a.
15.25
10.33
5.71

11.7
34.1
41.7
22,881
-29,493

12.3
38.0
42.2
36,553
-40,606

14.6
38.9
43.7
44,649
-48,041

14.8
41.8
48.6
55,731
-63,360

2.4
39.3
45.5
54,677
-63,834

3,195

3,268

-622

4,887

7,390

4,946
14.26
25.59
28,088
19,765
8,322

6,813
25.44
25.32
52,668
30,034
22,634

-1,089
30.28
25.15
65,522
36,343
29,179

5,795
36.94
24.92
83,166
42,071
41,095

7,111
38.64
25.34
90,824
53,210
37,613

Foreign Sector
Exports, goods & Services, annual % growth1
Exports as a % of GDP
Imports as a % of GDP
Merchandise Exports, million US$2
Merchandise Imports, US$2
Direct Investment & other Long-Term Capital,
million US$2
Portfolio Investment & Other Short-Term Capital,
million US$2
Gross International Reserves, billion US$1
Official Exchange Rate, baht per $, average1
External Indebtedness, Total, million US$2
External Indebtedness, Long-term, million US$2
External Indebtedness, Short-term, million US$2

Sources: 1. World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-ROM, 1998; 2. Asian Development Bank,
http://internotes.asiandevbank.org/notes/tha/THAFIN.htm, and /THANACT.htm.
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